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**Abstract: "The Lightning Bolt and the Quill:
Determining the Role of Air Force Public Affairs in Information Warfare"**

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Summary:

As the Air Force's internal and external public voice, Air Force public affairs is uniquely positioned to influence the flow of information to different audiences about a variety of issues and operations. In this new operating environment, Air Force public affairs must determine its proper role in information warfare.

The key to determining this role is to examine the tension between the public information and public relations functions of Air Force public affairs. The *public information function* focuses on the complete release of all information about the Air Force. The *public relations function* focuses on influencing public opinion to benefit the Air Force.

A survey of documents defining the mission of public affairs suggests conflicting views within the US military concerning the public information and public relations functions. Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents define the mission of public affairs strictly in terms of public information, and even prohibit some public relations activities. Air Force documents define the mission of public affairs in terms of both public information and public relations, permitting the use of accurate, honest public information to perform public relations. Moreover, the Air Force public affairs core competencies (Trusted Counsel to Leaders, Airman Morale and Readiness, Public Trust and Support, Global Influence and Deterrence) identify several important public relations activities.

Several Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents explicitly constrain the potential information warfare role of Air Force public affairs. The following list of constraints emerges from these publications:

1. Quickly and completely release all information.
2. Never release any kind of misinformation.
3. The only valid reasons for restricting or withholding information are national or operational security and the safety and privacy of personnel.
4. Do not manipulate public opinion.

The first three constraints are reasonable and important for protecting democratic accountability and organizational credibility. The fourth constraint conflicts with the actual activities of Air Force public affairs, fails to acknowledge the military value of influencing public opinion, and is based on the false assumption that influencing public opinion requires lies and propaganda.

Public affairs can contribute to information warfare by identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations. The following principles should guide public affairs information warfare:

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a. Quickly release all information.
b. Release only genuine, factual information.
c. Identify audiences whose opinions will affect operations.
d. Target those audiences only with messages based on genuine, factual information.

To help identify and target key audiences for public affairs information warfare, I have developed the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model. This model depicts the relationships between key opinion groups, and can be configured to reflect the actual relationships between opinion groups in any relevant society. In the fog and friction of war, the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model provides a systematic way to rapidly analyze centers of opinion and how they can influence combat operations.

Applying the model to the Gulf War and Somalia demonstrates its value. The Gulf War case demonstrates how public affairs successfully contributed to Saddam Hussein's mistaken focus on the Kuwaiti coast as a point of defense, and how public affairs successfully repelled Iraq's information attacks following the accidental killing of Iraqi civilians. The Somalia case highlights the vulnerability of American opinion centers of gravity to information attack, even when waged by forces from societies with little technology.

Attempting to determine the role of Air Force public affairs in information warfare results in the following five recommendations:

1. Resolve the conflict between DOD/JCS and Air Force doctrine.
2. Adopt the following definition of public affairs information warfare: "Identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations."
3. Incorporate the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model into public affairs planning.
4. Institutionalize the capability to recommend public affairs information warfare courses of action during ongoing operations.
5. Conduct further research to determine what kind of military public affairs American citizens expect.

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"The Lightning Bolt and the Quill: Determining the Role of Air Force Public Affairs in Information Warfare"

Air Force public affairs must determine its role in information warfare

Because of the information revolution, in the future images and events may be broadcast live from the battlefield, allowing public opinion to affect ongoing military operations, and making information an increasingly significant weapon of war.

As the Air Force's internal and external public voice, Air Force public affairs is uniquely positioned to influence the flow of information to different audiences about a variety of issues and operations. In this new operating environment, Air Force public affairs must determine its proper role in information warfare.

Public Information or Public Relations?

The key to determining this role is to examine the tension between the public information and public relations functions of Air Force public affairs.

The *public information function* focuses on the complete release of all information about the Air Force.

The *public relations function* focuses on influencing public opinion to benefit the Air Force.

Conflict between DOD/JCS and AF views

A survey of documents defining the mission of public affairs suggests conflicting views within the US military concerning the public information and public relations functions.

Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents define the mission of public affairs strictly in terms of public information, and even prohibit some public relations activities.

Air Force documents define the mission of public affairs in terms of both public information and public relations, permitting the use of accurate, honest public information

to perform public relations. Moreover, the Air Force public affairs core competencies (Trusted Counsel to Leaders, Airman Morale and Readiness, Public Trust and Support, Global Influence and Deterrence) identify several important public relations activities.

Constraints on the role of public affairs in information warfare

Several Department of Defense and Joint Staff documents explicitly constrain the potential information warfare role of Air Force public affairs. The following list of constraints emerges from these publications:

1. Quickly and completely release all information.
2. Never release any kind of misinformation.
3. The only valid reasons for restricting or withholding information are national or operational security and the safety and privacy of personnel.
4. Do not manipulate public opinion.

The first three constraints are reasonable and important for protecting democratic accountability and organizational credibility.

The fourth constraint conflicts with the actual activities of Air Force public affairs, fails to acknowledge the military value of influencing public opinion, and is based on the false assumption that influencing public opinion requires lies and propaganda.

Public affairs *can* contribute to information warfare

Public affairs can contribute to information warfare by identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations. The following principles should guide public affairs information warfare:

a. Quickly release all information.
b. Release only genuine, factual information.
c. Identify audiences whose opinions will affect operations.

d. Target those audiences only with messages based on genuine, factual information.

Opinion Centers of Gravity Model: A tool for public affairs information warfare

To help identify and target key audiences for public affairs information warfare, I have developed the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model.

This model depicts the relationships between key opinion groups, and can be configured to reflect the actual relationships between opinion groups in any relevant society. In the fog and friction of war, the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model provides a systematic way to rapidly analyze centers of opinion and how they can influence combat operations.

Applying the model to the Gulf War and Somalia demonstrates its value:

The Gulf War case demonstrates how public affairs successfully contributed to Saddam Hussein's mistaken focus on the Kuwaiti coast as a point of defense, and how public affairs successfully repelled Iraq's information attacks following the accidental killing of Iraqi civilians.

The Somalia case highlights the vulnerability of American opinion centers of gravity to information attack, even when waged by forces from societies with little technology.

Recommendations

Attempting to determine the role of Air Force public affairs in information warfare results in the following five recommendations:

I. Resolve the conflict between DOD/JCS and Air Force doctrine by:

— continuing to explicitly identify only the public information function of public affairs in DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

— removing prohibitions on the public relations function of public affairs from DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

II. Adopt the following definition of public affairs information warfare:

— "Identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations."

III. Incorporate the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model into public affairs planning.

IV. Institutionalize the capability to recommend public affairs information warfare courses of action during ongoing operations.

V. Conduct further research to determine what kind of military public affairs American citizens expect:

"One that shovels out all of its data in a war, making the enemy's job easier -- or one that uses the Truth to dissuade potential aggressors, persuade the enemy, and harness public support when we have a legitimate national interest at stake."[*]

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[*] The choice facing the American people as described by: Maj. Kenneth McClellan, Deputy Chief, Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Resources Division, Electronic mail correspondence, 26 March 1998.

Table of Contents
Key points

I. Problem:
What is the proper role for Air Force public affairs in information warfare?

Sun Tzu said that "one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements."[1] Information has always been a critical component of warfare, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has identified information warfare as a vital center of future American military endeavors[2]. Access to information about military operations is becoming easier and faster. In the past, military and civilian information channels were distinct, and information from the front lines reached both friendly and enemy audiences with enough delay to prevent public opinion from affecting ongoing battles. In the future:

> "news of military operations [will be] broadcast real-time to the American public, allies, and adversaries. Unofficial public analysis, critiques, and commentaries can affect military operations in progress. Such debates can affect strategic goals, operational decision-making, tactical execution, morale, esprit and effectiveness of the forces involved."
> TRADOC PAM 525-69: Concept for Information Operations[3]

This new operating environment is making information an increasingly significant weapon of war.

Commanders are increasingly competing   Source: DOD Combat Camera
for information on the battlefield

As the Air Force's internal and external public voice, Air Force public affairs is uniquely positioned to influence the flow of information to different audiences about a variety of issues and operations. Already, Air Force public affairs takes great advantage of information technology to improve its operations and to directly communicate with audiences that previously relied on newspapers or television for knowledge about military matters. The proficiency of Air Force

public affairs at employing information technology and the increasing importance of information warfare provide an important opportunity to determine if there is a role for Air Force public affairs in information warfare.

This paper hopes to address that question by focusing on the tension between providing the open flow of information that fosters transparency and accountability, and controlling information in ways that benefit operations and achieve Air Force goals.

On the spectrum between open access to information and control of information, where does Air Force public affairs belong?

Openness — public information ← ? → Control — public relations

1.1 Preview of the Analysis

After defining some key terms and outlining my methods of research and analysis, I will present an overview of current public affairs operations, focusing my discussion on the tension between the public information and public relations roles of Air Force public affairs. I will then discuss Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force constraints on public affairs operations, and will reveal how public affairs can contribute to information warfare without violating these constraints. Next I will introduce a model which can help analyze wartime public affairs operations in a rapid yet systematic fashion, and will illustrate the model's value by applying it to successful and unsuccessful public affairs efforts. Finally, I will present recommendations for conducting public affairs information warfare, and will examine the strengths and weaknesses of possible alternatives.

1.2 Definition: Public Affairs

Broadly defined, public affairs refers to those elements of a military organization that organize, train, and equip personnel for the purpose of conveying information about the organization to internal and external audiences. Because conveying information is not necessarily a neutral activity two potentially competing functions coexist in public affairs organizations:

Public information: complete release of all information about the organization.

Public relations: influencing public opinion to benefit the organization.

A short discussion of various public affairs mission statements will illustrate the tension within the Air Force public affairs community between these two functions.

Public information is the focus of the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff's statements of the public affairs mission:

- "Public Affairs' mission is the maximum release of information to the American public consistent with national and operational security."—Department of Defense Directive 5122.5: Public Affairs

- "The mission of joint Public Affairs (PA) is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audience."—Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations

The public information function is also paramount in at least one Air Force document:

- "It is the responsibility of public affairs (PA) to communicate information about Air Force programs and activities both to the general public and Air Force members and their families so they will be better informed about how well the Air Force is prepared to carry out its mission."—Air Force Policy Directive 35-1: Public Affairs Management

On the other hand, the Air Force's document governing public communication programs and a personal statement of the Air Force's recently retired director of public affairs lean towards the public relations function:

- "The Air Force will conduct comprehensive, active public communications programs at all levels of command to earn public understanding, acceptance, and support of the Air Force mission."—Air Force Policy Directive 35-1: Public Communication Programs

- "Through solid public affairs research, planning, execution, and evaluation, the Air Force must create and foster a compelling image of its mission . . . . [P]ublic affairs creates and executes tactical and strategic plans that enhance the Air Force mission through proactively delivered information that builds informed internal and external public support for the Air Force."—Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Sconyers, "Revolutionary Air Force Public Affairs: The Vision."

While the latter two examples do not suggest that the public relations function is incompatible with the public information function, they do suggest a mixed view about the role of public affairs.

1.3 Definition: Information Warfare

The Air Force's primer on information warfare defines it as "any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and information functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions."[4] The primer identifies four "information functions." In the following list, I have provided an example of how public affairs could affect each of those information functions *in the absence of legal or moral restrictions*[5].

1. Acquire data and store it: If the news media is an enemy's primary source of battlefield data, then denying the news media access to the battlefield can disrupt the enemy's data acquisition.

2. Process data and turn it into information: If you understand the enemy's decision-making process, then selectively releasing information to the news media can affect that process.

3. Transmit information: If an enemy transmits mis-information to a key audience, then targeting that audience with a media campaign can cause them to believe your information, interfering with the enemy's transmission.

4. Utilize information: On a dynamic battlefield, old information is often useless information; therefore, delaying the release of key information to the news media can render that information useless.

The primer also identifies three goals of information warfare: to control information, exploit that control, and enhance other operations[6]. Once again, these goals are listed with examples of how they might be applied to public affairs *in the absence of legal or moral restrictions.*

1. Control: Public affairs can control information by "attacking" enemy audiences and "defending" from enemy media attacks with targeted media campaigns.

2. Exploit: Having established control by discrediting enemy propaganda campaigns, it is possible to exploit that control by following up with key media messages.

3. Enhance: Public affairs campaigns increase public support for military operations, which enhances combat effectiveness by improving morale and access to resources.

The above information functions and information warfare goals provide a good summary of the concept of information warfare. The examples illustrate that public affairs can contribute to

information warfare. Following a discussion of my methods, the remainder of this analysis will focus on whether public affairs *should* be involved in information warfare, and if so, *how*?

2 Methods

2.1 Research Methods

The primary research methods for this analysis were literature review and organizational experience. I reviewed all Joint Doctrine and Air Force publications concerning public affairs, information warfare, and related topics. Additionally, I reviewed a significant body of literature concerning contemporary issues in military-media relations (most of this literature was provided by the Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics, and Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government). In June 1997, I interned at a base-level Air Force public affairs office, and I interned in July and August 1997 with the public affairs advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force and then with the strategic planning and media relations divisions of Air Force public affairs at the national headquarters level (Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs). While in these positions, I experienced public affairs operations first hand, and discussed at length public affairs operations with junior and senior enlisted personnel and officers. Other research included the review of miscellaneous documentaries and publications. The References section contains a complete bibliography.

2.2 Methods of Analysis

I divided the analysis of the research into two broad areas: *descriptive analysis* and *normative analysis*. To fully describe the relevant characteristics of Air Force public affairs operations, I examined the following topics:

1. Public affairs mission statements
2. Core competencies
3. Key audiences
4. Tools for reaching key audiences
5. Organizational structure
6. Peacetime activities

5

7. Wartime activities
8. Constraints on public affairs activities

The conclusions drawn from this descriptive analysis became the initial part of my normative

analysis. I first present arguments concerning the existing constraints on public affairs activities. I

then develop a model for analyzing wartime public affairs operations as they relate to information

warfare. Applying this model, I analyze examples of successful and unsuccessful public affairs

operations. Finally, I use the descriptive and normative analyses to come up with

recommendations about public affairs and information warfare.

3 Descriptive Analysis

This section presents an overview of Air Force public affairs operations. Air Force public

affairs contains four primary functional divisions (media relations, community relations, internal

information, and security and policy review) at three basic levels of command (Secretary of the Air

Force, major command, and wing). See Appendix I for a more detailed illustration of the structure

designed to accomplish the mission of Air Force public affairs.

3.1 The Public Affairs Mission

The following excerpts from Department of Defense, Joint Staff, and Air Force

publications and from the writings of both the current and former Air Force directors of public

affairs define the basic public affairs mission:

DOD Directive 5122.5: Public Affairs

"Public Affairs' mission is the maximum release of information to
the American public consistent with national and operational
security."

JP 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations

"The mission of joint Public Affairs (PA) is to expedite the flow of
accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint
forces to the public and internal audience."

Air Force Policy Directive 35-1: Public Affairs Management

"It is the responsibility of public affairs (PA) to communicate information about Air Force programs and activities both to the general public and Air Force members and their families so they will be better informed about how well the Air Force is prepared to carry out its mission."

Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Sconyers,
former Director of Public Affairs, US Air Force

"Through solid public affairs research, planning, execution, and evaluation, the Air Force must create and foster a compelling image of its mission . . . ."[7]

Col. Ronald T. Rand,
Director of Public Affairs, US Air Force

"We'll reinforce the USAF reputation for always doing the right thing. We'll also help all our important audiences understand the Air Force's value to America. Finally, we'll ensure the Air Force speaks with one voice at all levels, in good times and in crisis."[8]

3.2 Public Affairs Core Competencies

In October 1997, Air Force public affairs articulated four core competencies which are considered to be the minimum capacities required for organizational success. The following list includes key excerpts from the official explanation of each core competency[9]. The complete explanation of each core competency can be found in Appendix II.

Trusted Counsel to Leaders: PA delivers candid and timely counsel and guidance to commanders on decisions that affect the Air Force's ability to accomplish its mission.

- "enables leaders to accurately forecast the ramifications of their actions and their impact on public opinion."

- "identify and analyze key issues, develop messages, conduct media training, target specific audiences, recommend methods of delivery, and measure and evaluate results."

- "helps build public support."

Airman Morale and Readiness: PA provides leaders with an arsenal of effective and efficient two-way communication tools to build, maintain and strengthen morale and readiness.

- "provides leaders with . . . two-way communication tools to build, maintain and strengthen morale and readiness.

- "Timely, relevant and accurate information is a force multiplier that enhances airman morale and readiness."

Public Trust and Support: PA strengthens the bonds between the Air Force and the public through open, honest dialogue and programs targeted to communities, opinion leaders and the media.

- "strengthens the bonds between the Air Force and the public through open, honest dialogue."

- "The American public provides the people who join our Air Force, the funds that ensure readiness and quality of life, and the support needed to conduct operations and training."

- "promote public understanding and support of the Air Force."

Global Influence and Deterrence: PA develops and implements communication strategies targeted toward informing national and international audiences about air and space power's impact on global events.

- "media coverage can influence military operations."

- "Telling the Air Force story is a force multiplier which creates virtual force projection and presence around the world."

- "Educating international audiences about Air Force core competencies deters potential adversaries."

3.3 Discussion of Mission and Core Competencies

Examining the various documents governing the mission of public affairs, there seems to be a definite tension between the Department of Defense and Joint Staff view that public affairs should be limited to the public information realm and the Air Force view that public information serves a public relations function. DOD and Joint Staff publications basically state that the mission of public affairs is to "expedite the flow of timely information" about the US military to internal and external audiences for the purpose of keeping the public informed[10]. While it is implicit that informing the public will garner public support, there is no explicit discussion of why it might be important for the public to be well informed, or that informing the public might somehow influence public opinion. In contrast, Air Force publications, as well as the writings of the Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Sconyers, the Air Force's recently retired director of public affairs, explicitly state that the purpose of keeping the public well informed is to gain public support for Air Force programs and activities. Gen. Sconyers explains why public support is so necessary to the Air Force,

pointing out that "Carl von Clauswitz cited public opinion as a center of gravity in war fighting."[11] Additionally, the Air Force public affairs core competencies contain unequivocal references to the public relations function of public affairs, and explanations for the importance of using public information to gain public support and to influence international audiences[12]. Col. Ronald T. Rand, the current director of public affairs, is less explicit about the value of public support, but still hopes to reinforce a positive view of the Air Force. Additionally, Col. Rand recently reaffirmed the basic text of the public affairs core competencies[13]. While all of the Air Force documents governing public affairs stress that open and honest public information is the principle by which public affairs operates, it is clear that the Air Force view of public affairs explicitly links public information to public relations.

3.4 Key Audiences of Public Affairs

While the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force documents governing public affairs do not all refer to the same groups, it is possible to infer the following key internal and external audiences:

Internal Audiences
- Airmen and other US military personnel
- Air Force and Department of Defense civilian employees
- Dependents of military and civilian personnel
- Air Force and other US military leaders

External Audiences
- Air Force and other military retirees
- American public
- American leaders
  - President
  - Congress
  - State and local officials
  - Community leaders
  - National opinion leaders (e.g.: William Safire, Pat Robertson)
- Foreign public
- Foreign military personnel
- Foreign leaders
- International leaders (e.g.: United Nations, North Atlantic Council)
- International opinion leaders (e.g.: Pope, UN Secretary General)

3.5 Tools for Communicating With Key Audiences

The following list includes the standard tools by which public affairs communicates with the above key audiences:

AF Issues Book: Quarterly publication provides Air Force leaders guidance from the Air Force Communications Council on key issues.

AF Issues Web Site: Internet site to provide commanders and supervisors with timely and accurate information on key issues. This is also accessible to internal audiences.

AF Link (web site): The Air Force's primary internet site for both internal and external communications.

Air Force Times: Weekly newspaper produced independently of the Air Force designed for both internal and external audiences interested in Air Force issues.

Air Shows: Local, national, and international communities see first-hand demonstrations of Air Force capabilities.

Airman Magazine: The Air Force's monthly corporate magazine primarily designed for internal audiences, but also read extensively by the Air Force retiree community.

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS): Provides American news and entertainment to US forces stationed overseas, and is a way for commanders to communicate with troops and their dependents.

Base Cable TV Channel: Provides specific event information and notices to the base community.

Base Newspapers: Every Air Force base has its own newspaper for communicating with internal audiences.

Combat Camera: Military organization trained and equipped to bring still and motion pictures from combat zones to all audiences.

Commander's Call: Face-to-face presentations from commanders to their troops.

Commander's Hotline: Telephone line for Air Force personnel to express their concerns anonymously to the local commander. Commanders usually answer these concerns through a regular column in the base newspaper.

Facilities Tours: Local community audiences tour Air Force facilities and learn about Air Force operations.

International News Media: International, foreign, national, and local audiences watch, listen to, and read international broadcast and print media.

Local News Media: Local audiences watch, listen to, and read local broadcast and print media.

National News Media: National, local, and some international audiences watch, listen to, and read national broadcast and print media.

PA Link (web site): Internet forum for professional guidance and discussion accessible only to Air Force public affairs personnel.

Speakers Bureaus: Key Air Force and military leaders speak at internal and external organizations and events.

Appendix III contains a matrix of public affairs tools, the primary public affairs core competency each tool supports, and whether the message content of each tool is under direct Air Force control.

3.6 Peacetime Public Affairs Operations

For the purpose of this analysis, the term "peacetime" refers to any state of military activity that is not a war, contingency, or other deployed operation. Conversely, the term "wartime" refers to all states of military activity that involve war, contingency, or other deployed operations, including military operations other than war. The peacetime activities of public affairs can be broken down into three broad categories: daily operations, professional training, and wartime preparation.

Daily Operations

Daily public affairs operations primarily consist of public affairs personnel using the variety of tools listed in the previous section and in Appendix III to perform the media relations, community relations, internal information, and security and policy review functions. Generally, SAF/PA provides ongoing guidance to MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU public affairs staffs, while performing public affairs functions at the Air Force headquarters level. MAJCOM public affairs staffs in turn provide guidance to the various wing and local public affairs staffs under their control, while performing public affairs functions at the MAJCOM headquarters level. Wing, FOA, DRU, and other local public affairs staffs perform public affairs functions for their particular organizations.[14]

While SAF/PA is the top of the public affairs hierarchy for daily guidance, it receives broader public affairs guidance from the Air Force Communications Council. The Communications Council is an advisory committee consisting of the secretary of the Air Force, the

director of public affairs, the Air Force chief of staff, and other key Air Force leaders. The Communications Council meets quarterly to analyze the communications environment and determine the communication themes, priorities, and key messages which will guide Air Force public affairs during the following quarter.

Professional Training

Professional training requirements for each Air Force career field are outlined in a Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP)[15]. The two CFETPs for public affairs contain education and training requirements at every stage of an individual's career for both officer and enlisted airmen and their civilian equivalents. Officers begin by attending the Public Affairs Officer course at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) during their first year in the public affairs career field[16]. As their careers progress, they attend various intermediate and advanced public affairs leadership courses in addition to the standard Air Force professional military education courses and are expected to earn a public affairs related masters degree[17]. Enlisted airmen begin their public affairs careers by attending the Basic Journalism Course at DINFOS[18]. As their careers progress, they accomplish various stages of on-the-job-training and attend advanced and specialized public affairs courses at DINFOS[19]. Additionally, enlisted airmen have the opportunity to earn degrees from the Community College of the Air Force[20].

Wartime Preparation

In addition to performing daily public affairs functions and developing professional public affairs skills, much of peacetime operations consists of planning and training for wartime. At the SAF/PA level, public affairs officers develop wartime plans and coordinate them with DOD and Joint Staff public affairs plans[21]. An Air Force Public Affairs Wartime Planning Council (PAWPC) meets annually to[22]:

- Review DOD, Joint Staff, and Air Force doctrine, policy, and guidance.
- Ensure the standardization of public affairs personnel, equipment, and training.
- Help MAJCOMs obtain necessary equipment and resources.

- Monitor the ability of public affairs to meet operation plan (OPlan) taskings.

Additionally, unified command, Numbered Air Force, MAJCOM, and unit public affairs staffs develop, review, and maintain OPlan public affairs annexes for use during wartime[23].

Public Affairs Combat Training course, Fort Wolters, Texas   Source: Air Force News Service

Training for war beyond the skills taught as part of public affairs professional training is the primary responsibility of local unit commanders[24]. Local units are responsible for firearms, nuclear biological chemical (NBC), first aid, and other forms of mobility skills training[25]. Additionally, public affairs personnel practice and hone their wartime skills through participation in various exercises. Exercise participation, as well as attendance at supplementary war skills training courses such as Public Affairs Combat Training, are monitored and coordinated by SAF/PA through MAJCOM public affairs staffs[26].

3.7 Wartime Public Affairs Operations

During wartime, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs establishes a wartime public affairs cell to provide continuous planning, guidance, and coordination to service and joint public affairs operations[27]. At home bases, peacetime public affairs activities are maintained and are often supported by public affairs individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) from the Air

Force Reserve[28]. The commander of a wartime operation assumes control of the public affairs staff supporting that operation[29]. A wartime public affairs staff provides the basic public affairs functions, but the media relations function becomes predominant (Appendix IV)[30].

JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU

The heart of wartime public affairs   Source: Joint Publication 3-61, p. III-9

A joint information bureau (JIB) is formed to serve as a single point of interface between deployed forces and the news media[31]. The primary purpose of a JIB is to provide timely and accurate information to the news media about ongoing operations and to serve as an infrastructure to facilitate news media operations[32]. According to Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, members of the JIB should try to protect operational security through education and security review at the source of information potentially useful to an enemy and should make every effort to facilitate full and open news media coverage of operations[33]. The history of the tension between the military's desire for operational security and the news media's

desire for free access to and coverage of military operations is beyond the scope of this analysis; however, Appendix V illustrates the current DOD guidelines on the subject.

During wartime, internal information programs become more focused and intense in order to maximize troop morale and readiness and keep families at home informed about their deployed loved ones[34]. Electronic information systems (EIS) are used to facilitate a two-way flow of information between forces in the field and military personnel and dependents at home bases[35]. Additionally, deployed public affairs staffs use EIS to download articles and information to support newspapers and command newsletters produced in the field for deployed forces[36]. In addition to supporting internal information programs, deployed public affairs staffs use EIS to apprise commanders and their staffs of how the news media are covering their operations[37].

3.8 Current Constraints on Public Affairs in Information Warfare

Several types of military operations involve attempts to influence the opinions and behaviors of foreign actors. In addition to the documents directly governing public affairs, documents governing these other types of operations help define the framework and boundaries for current public affairs operations.

The Public Affairs Mission

The mission of public affairs provides the initial constraint on public affairs activities. Whether taken from DOD, Joint Staff, or Air Force statements of the public affairs mission, the basic mission is to *maximize the flow of timely and accurate information to the public consistent with national and operational security*[38].

DOD Directive 5122.5: DOD Principles of Information

As well as reinforcing the "maximum release, minimum delay" mission of public affairs, the DOD Principles of Information contain additional specific constraints:

- "The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit."

- "A free flow of general and military information will be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents."

- "Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment."

15

- "Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces."

- "The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda has no place in Department of Defense public affairs programs."

Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations

Definition of psychological operations:

> "Psychological operations (PSYOP) are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."[39]

The joint doctrine for psychological operations does acknowledge a role for public affairs:

- "As open sources to foreign countries and the Unites States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information."[40]

- "Within the United States, PA channels can be used to provide facts that will counter foreign propaganda, including disinformation, directed at the United States."[41]

However, it also places an important constraint on public affairs:

- "To maintain the credibility of military PA, care must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating such PA channels."[42]

Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

Definition of military deception:

> "Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission."[43]

The joint doctrine for military deception places important constraints which apply to both military deception operations and public affairs:

- "Deception operations will not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US news media."[44]

- "Misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence US decision makers and public opinion is contrary to Department of Defense policy."[45]

Joint Publication 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations

- "joint PA operations should not focus on directing or manipulating public actions or opinion."[46]

- "by law PA and PSYOP must be separate and distinct."[47]

Col. Ronald T. Rand, Director of Public Affairs, US Air Force

- "Let's work together to found a doctrine on the bedrock of truth. And let's not stray from that position, water it down, or qualify it in any way."[48]

3.8.1 Distilled List of Constraints

Examining all of the above documents, it is possible to distill the following list of constraints on public affairs operations:

1)   Quickly and completely release all information.

2)   Never release any kind of misinformation.

3)   The only valid reasons for restricting or withholding information are national or operational security and the safety and privacy of personnel.

4)   Do not manipulate public opinion.

3.8.2 Discussion of Current Constraints

The first three constraints seem very reasonable on both moral and pragmatic grounds. Democracy is based on the moral principle that people have the right to make informed choices about their own governance. The first three constraints are vital to the kind of government transparency that is necessary for informed decision making and for oversight by citizens and their elected representatives. Additionally, the most important asset public affairs has is its credibility. If audiences fail to believe the information released by public affairs, then public affairs loses its value to the Air Force and its ability to accomplish its mission. The first three constraints are necessary to preserve that credibility.

The fourth constraint is problematic because it may conflict with the actual activities of Air Force public affairs. While the open and honest flow of information from the Air Force to the public encompassed in the first three constraints is the guiding principle of Air Force public affairs, it is done so for the express purpose not only of informing the public, but of gaining public support. When the Air Force Communications Council determines quarterly communications themes, it does so by evaluating Air Force goals and determining how public affairs can contribute to achieving them. Moreover, it identifies key audiences and determines messages which, if

17

properly communicated, are intended to influence those audiences to act in manners consistent with Air Force goals.

Perhaps the difference between *influencing* and *manipulating* key audiences is more than semantic. The pejorative implications of the term *manipulating* may suggest an element of deceit. If attempting to *manipulate* an audience inherently requires some form of deceit, then it would violate the principles of openness and honesty which guide public affairs and protect its credibility. If, on the other hand, attempting to *influence* an audience means targeted communication of messages which are open, honest, and factual, then such activities would be well within the bounds of legal and moral constraints placed on public affairs.

The question then becomes: is it possible for public affairs to contribute to information warfare while remaining within the bounds of these constraints?

4 Normative Analysis

4.1 Public Affairs Can Contribute To Information Warfare

Following the same principles which guide the activities of the Air Force Communications Council, public affairs could contribute to information warfare while remaining within the bounds of legal and moral constraints and without undermining the credibility of public affairs. This could be accomplished by doing the following:

1. *Quickly release all information.* Only restrict information that would compromise national security, operational security, or the safety and privacy of personnel. When such information no longer poses a threat, release it immediately. Additionally, establishing public affairs as the best source of adverse information about the Air Force can only enhance the credibility of Air Force public affairs, making it more effective.

2. *Release only genuine, factual information.* Misinformation is illegal, immoral, and can only harm the Air Force in the long term. If nothing else, misinformation destroys the credibility of public affairs, hindering its ability to do its job.

3. *Identify audiences whose opinions will affect operations.* Since there are not enough resources to release all information to all audiences all of the time, it becomes necessary to make decisions about which audiences will have priority. This is exactly what the Communications Council does.

4. *Target those audiences only with messages based on genuine, factual information.* Determine what accurate, factual messages would influence the target audience in a manner beneficial to ongoing operations. Use various public affairs tools to communicate those messages to the key audiences.

From the analysis of existing operations and constraints we can consider the definition of public affairs information warfare to be:

> **Identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations.**
> — Possible definition of Public Affairs Information Warfare

It is possible to apply public affairs information warfare to the Air Force definition of information warfare without violating constraints on public affairs:

<u>Interfering with enemy information functions</u>

1. <u>Acquire data and store it</u>: Restrict the release of data which would be useful to an enemy, since release of such data would violate operational security and threaten the safety of personnel. It is important to remember that such data should be released as soon as it no longer would compromise safety and security.

2. <u>Process data and turn it into information</u>: Target enemy decision makers with accurate, factual messages designed to influence their decision making process. A good example of this would be publicizing bombing capabilities to deter an enemy.

3. <u>Transmit information</u>: Establish credibility with audiences the enemy may try to influence and target those audiences with accurate, factual messages to bolster their support for US operations. This will interfere with enemy attempts to transmit messages to those audiences since they will consider American public affairs to be a more credible source of information.

4. <u>Utilize information</u>: Expedite the release of adverse news about American operations as long as it will not compromise operational security. This seizes the initiative from the enemy and makes that bad news less useful to enemy public affairs efforts.

Achieving information warfare goals

1. Control: Control information by establishing Air Force public affairs as the most credible source of both good and adverse information about Air Force operations.

2. Exploit: Exploit the control gained through credibility by "attacking" enemy audiences and "defending" from enemy attacks with accurate, factual messages.

3. Enhance: Enhance operations with high levels of morale by winning and maintaining public support for Air Force operations, and by keeping airmen informed of that support.

4.2 Opinion Centers of Gravity Model

### 4.2.1 Description of the Model

Figure A: Model configured for United States

In order to properly identify and target key audiences for the purpose of public affairs information warfare, it would be useful to have a systematic way to rapidly analyze centers of opinion and how they can influence Air Force combat operations. I have developed the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model to provide such a framework. The basic model depicts opinion centers of gravity, or key opinion groups, connected by black lines of influence which represent the existence and direction of influence between these groups. For example, Figure A illustrates that in the United States public opinion influences our National Command Authorities (NCA), but NCA opinion also influences public opinion. (Note: "CC" in the model is military shorthand for "commander.") In an open democracy, two-way influence is the norm; however, this model is

20

powerful because it can be configured to reflect the actual relationships of any particular society

before a conflict begins.

Figure B: Model configured for a totalitarian state

Applying the model to a totalitarian regime illustrates this point. The model in Figure B

suggests that trying to influence public opinion in this particular totalitarian regime would be a poor

way to affect the decisions and behavior of this state's national leaders or military commanders

since public opinion has little or no influence on these actors. Additionally, it suggests that public

opinion may still influence the average soldier, so it may be possible to affect the thoughts and

behavior of these troops by targeting messages at the general public.

For the model to be most useful as a military tool it is necessary to join the model of our

own opinion centers of gravity with that of a potential enemy. When connecting two warring

societies, the model relies on the assumption that such societies interact at the level of public

opinion primarily through the news media. When a state of war begins, person to person contact

between citizens of warring countries that may have existed prior to hostilities likely reduces to

insignificant levels. It may be possible to identify other interactions between societies; however,

they would be beyond the scope of a model intended to serve wartime public affairs operations.

Figure C is the complete form of the model, and shows how Air Force public affairs can perform

"information attacks" by targeting key centers of enemy opinion with accurate, factual messages

intended to influence the behavior of enemy leaders and forces. Additionally, the model helps

identify likely targets of enemy "information attacks" so that public affairs can proactively target

centers of gravity for "information defense."

Figure C: Complete model illustrates interaction of opinion centers between warring states

Applied to the case of a conflict between the United States and an imaginary totalitarian

enemy, this model tells us the following:

1) The opinions of the enemy public, military commanders, and military forces have little influence on their national leadership.

2) The opinions of the enemy public and the enemy forces have little influence on military commanders.

   • These two points tell us that the way to influence enemy commanders and forces is to directly target public affairs operations against the enemy NCA and military commanders.

3) The opinion of enemy military commanders has little influence on the enemy public.

4) The enemy public and military forces have very little access to the news media. (In this case "access" means access as consumers of the news. The news media may still be able to report on these groups.)

- This tells us that even if public opinion heavily influenced enemy leaders, commanders, and forces, or if the opinion of enemy forces heavily influenced their commanders, it would be impossible to use the news media effectively to convey targeted messages to these audiences.

5) All American opinion centers of gravity are likely targets for the enemy.

- This tells us that the enemy may try to attack our own opinion centers of gravity. Therefore, public affairs operations targeted at these audiences may be necessary to proactively defend against enemy information attacks.

It is important to realize that the above case is an imaginary enemy. The power of the model lies in the fact that it can be pre-configured to represent the realities of the society of any potential enemy. In addition to being a useful resource during the preparatory phases of Air Force operations, this model would give public affairs personnel a tool to analyze their operations in a systematic yet rapid way during the heat of battle.

4.2.2 Applying the Model to Successes and Failures

Applying the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model to the Gulf War and Somalia will not only further demonstrate its value, but will show how public affairs has effectively and ineffectively waged information warfare in the past.

The Gulf War Example

During the Gulf war, Saddam Hussein's weak intelligence networks made CNN an important source of battlefield information[49]. Knowing this, CENTCOM publicized four major amphibious landing exercises and later stationed marine amphibious units off of the Kuwaiti coast[50]. By conveying to Saddam Hussein the message that the US Marines stationed off of the Kuwaiti coast were trained and ready for a major amphibious assault, public affairs used an accurate, factual message to contribute to the Iraqis concentrating their forces in the south, leaving their west flank open to attack[51].

Saddam Hussein attacked American and allied public opinion in an attempt to influence the outcome of the war. Coalition air forces had information that a hardened bunker in Baghdad was being used as a command and control center[52]. When they bombed the bunker, it turned out to be full of civilian women and children[53]. Iraqi officials brought journalists to report on the carnage,

claiming to the world that the US and its allies were intentionally trying to murder innocent women and children[54].

Figure D: Model configured for war between the United States and Iraq

24

While the circumstances surrounding the presence of civilians in that particular shelter were suspicious, it was true that US and allied air forces had bombed a shelter full of civilians[55]. Iraqi officials targeted all US opinion centers of gravity with this information attack, forcing public affairs to perform information defense. By heavily publicizing genuine coalition efforts to avoid civilian casualties, even at the cost of increased risk to air crews, public affairs began a proactive information defense even before this incident occurred[56]. Following the incident, public affairs successfully defended against this information attack in the sense that they persuaded key audiences to continue supporting the air campaign through the accurate and factual message that the bombing was a regrettable mistake and that the coalition policy of avoiding civilian casualties remained in effect[57].

The Somalia Example

US forces originally went to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance to starving Somalis[58]. It soon became clear that the clans of Aidid and Ali Mahdi were fighting for control of the country and stealing and controlling food as a source of power[59]. Eventually the American mission changed, and US forces were ordered to disarm warring clan members and apprehend their leaders[60]. Several American soldiers were killed and wounded in a failed attempt to apprehend Aidid[61]. Aidid supporters paraded the body of one dead American through the streets of the Somali capital, dragging it around and defiling it for the benefit of international journalists reporting the events. Seeing these horrifying images, the American people and the US Congress eventually withdrew their support for US intervention and American troops were brought home[62].

In this case, the low level of technology and decrepit infrastructure in Somalia made it impossible for public affairs to target Somali audiences. Additionally, it was difficult to tell which Somalis were innocent civilians and which were rebels, so the "forces" and "public" centers of gravity became heavily intertwined. Aidid's rebels very successfully waged an information attack on key American opinion centers of gravity, contributing to the decision to withdraw American forces. While public affairs was basically able to buttress military opinion centers of gravity, it

was unable to persuade the American people and the Congress to continue to support the

operation[63].

Figure F: Model configured for conflict between the United States and rebel factions running Somalia

4.2.3 Final Thoughts on the Model

The Opinion Centers of Gravity Model provides a useful tool to help Air Force public

affairs carry out its core competencies during wartime:

> Trusted Counsel to Leaders: The model will enhance the advice
> public affairs officers give to Air Force leaders during ongoing
> combat operations by helping them think more systematically about
> how public affairs can contribute to information warfare, and by
> providing a clear graphical way to communicate those contributions.

> Airman Morale and Readiness: Airman morale and readiness is
> included in the model's "forces" opinion center of gravity, helping
> public affairs officers to think systematically about defending this
> center of gravity against enemy attacks, and about the interactions
> between this and other opinion centers of gravity.

> Public Trust and Support: Public trust and support is included in the
> model's "public" opinion center of gravity, helping public affairs
> officers to think systematically about utilizing this center of gravity

26

to benefit combat operations, and about the interactions between this and other opinion centers of gravity.

Global Influence and Deterrence: The concept of using public affairs to provide global influence and deterrence is the principle upon which this model is based. By providing a systematic way analyze public affairs operations in relation to opinion centers of gravity, this model will enhance the ability of public affairs to provide global influence and deterrence.

5 Recommendations

5.1 Summary of Recommendations

I   Resolve the conflict between DOD and Joint Staff doctrine and Air Force doctrine by:

- continuing to explicitly identify only the public information function of public affairs in DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

- removing prohibitions on the public relations function of public affairs from DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

II   Adopt the following definition of public affairs information warfare:

> "identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to combat operations."

III   Incorporate the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model into public affairs planning.

IV   Institutionalize the capability to recommend public affairs information warfare courses of action during ongoing operations.

V   Conduct further research to determine what kind of military public affairs American citizens expect.

5.2 Explanation of Recommendations and Options

I   Resolve the conflict between DOD and Joint Staff doctrine and Air Force doctrine by:
- continuing to explicitly identify only the public information function of public affairs in DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

- removing prohibitions on the public relations function of public affairs from DOD and Joint Staff doctrine.

Imagine that a public affairs organization exists somewhere on a spectrum with the public information function at one end and the public relations function at the other end. In this case, three broad options exist:

1. *Public affairs could position itself entirely on the public information end of the spectrum*, devoting all of its time and energy to conveying every possible piece of information about the organization to every possible audience. To inform everybody about everything relating to an organization <u>would require virtually infinite resources.</u>

2. *Public affairs could position itself entirely on the public relations end of the spectrum*, devoting all of its time and energy to improving public opinion about the organization and influencing public opinion to achieve organizational goals. While this would not require infinite resources, a singular focus on public relations places higher value on winning public support than on accurate, factual messages, and <u>would make misinformation and propaganda acceptable public affairs tools.</u>

3. *Public affairs could position itself somewhere on the middle of the spectrum*, dividing its time and energy between public information and public relations. This options seeks to strike a balance between the reality of limited resources and the genuine need to gain public support. This option further requires a public affairs organization to determine the proper balance between public information and public relations.

   - One approach to striking this balance is to begin on the public relations end of the spectrum and try to move as far as possible towards the public information end of the spectrum without sacrificing any public support.

   - The other approach is to begin on the public information end of the spectrum and try to move as far as possible towards the public relations end of the spectrum without sacrificing credibility or accuracy.

   Both approaches may lead to the same point on the spectrum. However, the starting point on the spectrum would tend to define the institutional priority. If public information is the institutional priority, then during times of stress a solid wall remains between misinformation and accurate, targeted messages that also serve public relations purposes.

Air Force public affairs has chosen the third option, and has started at the public information end of the spectrum and struck an appropriate balance between public information and public relations, focusing on timely and accurate information as its primary tool. Maintaining this status quo would avoid any conflict or confusion within the organization about its purpose or priorities; however, this status quo is technically in conflict with the elements of DOD and Joint Staff doctrine which prohibit influencing public opinion.

There is no need for DOD or Joint Staff doctrine to make the public relations function explicit. The existence of an explicit public information function with an implicit public relations

function allows important public relations activities to occur while ensuring that the method of

public relations is timely and accurate information. Making the public relations function explicit

would downgrade public information as an institutional priority, shortening the leap from

influencing public opinion with accurate information to influencing public opinion with half-truths,

partial facts, and propaganda. However, in recognition of the fact that public information does

serve important public relations purposes, and in order to deconflict Air Force doctrine and practice

with Joint Staff doctrine, the following language should be removed from Joint Publication 3-61:

Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations: "joint PA operations should not focus on directing

or manipulating public actions or opinion."

II Adopt the following definition of public affairs information warfare:

> "identifying key audiences and targeting them with accurate, factual
> messages in order to influence opinion in a manner beneficial to
> combat operations."

The principles from section 4.1 guiding this definition bear repeating:

1. *Quickly release all information.* Only restrict information that would compromise national
   security, operational security, or the safety and privacy of personnel. When such information
   no longer poses a threat, release it immediately. Additionally, establishing public affairs as the
   best source of adverse information about the Air Force can only enhance the credibility of Air
   Force public affairs, making it more effective.

2. *Release only genuine, factual information.* Misinformation is illegal, immoral, and can only
   harm the Air Force in the long term. If nothing else, misinformation destroys the credibility of
   public affairs, hindering its ability to do its job.

3. *Identify audiences whose opinions will affect operations.* Since there are not enough
   resources to release all information to all audiences all of the time, it becomes necessary to
   make decisions about which audiences will have priority. This is exactly what the
   Communications Council does.

4. *Target those audiences only with messages based on genuine, factual information.*
   Determine what accurate, factual messages would influence the target audience in a manner
   beneficial to ongoing operations. Use various public affairs tools to communicate those
   messages to the key audiences.

This definition of public affairs information warfare would not substantially change the

current behavior of Air Force public affairs personnel. However, it does help answer the central

question of this paper: "What is the proper role for Air Force public affairs information warfare?"

III Incorporate the Opinion Centers of Gravity Model into public affairs planning.

The model would serve as a useful tool during the planning phases of Air Force operations, and would make it easy during the fog and friction of a war to rapidly yet systematically:

- Identify opinion centers of gravity.

- Analyze how opinion centers of gravity interact to affect Air Force operations.

- Identify promising targets of public affairs campaigns.

- Identify likely targets of enemy propaganda and public affairs campaigns.

If not this particular model, then a similar tool would be useful to public affairs operations, especially in wartime. The following list of actions would be elements of a plan to adopt this model:

- Conduct training seminars to teach the model to public affairs personnel.

- Brief the model at future public affairs leadership courses.

- Brief the model at the next annual Public Affairs Worldwide Conference

- Integrate the model into the DINFOS curriculum.

- Create a succinct pamphlet explaining the model.

- Provide an electronic pamphlet explaining the model on PA Link.

- Explain the model in one of the monthly public affairs guidance letters.

Since this model is relatively simple and easy to understand, adopting it would cost very little. An electronic explanation pamphlet would cost nothing but the time taken to create it, and could be very widely disseminated through PA Link. Training seminars would be the most costly implementation option, requiring trainers and trainees to take time out of their schedules; however, the model is simple enough that even this option would require a couple of hours at the very most.

IV Institutionalize the capability to recommend public affairs information warfare courses of action during ongoing operations.

Public affairs must be able to both plan and coordinate public affairs information warfare, as well as react to enemy public affairs information warfare. This can be accomplished by either or both of the following:

- Adding to the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs' wartime public affairs cell a public affairs officer versed in public affairs information warfare.

- Including public affairs information warfare as a significant part of public affairs education and training so that all public affairs personnel may include it in their professional repertoire.

> **V Conduct further research to determine what kind of military public affairs American citizens expect.**

This analysis is based on current public affairs doctrine and practice, and does not attempt to assess the will of the people concerning these issues. It would be valuable to know what kind of public affairs the American people expect from their military: "One that shovels out all of its data in a war, making the enemy's job easier -- or one that uses the Truth to dissuade potential aggressors, persuade the enemy, and harness public support when we have a legitimate national interest at stake."[64] This information would provide useful guidance for future discourse about the proper role of public affairs.

Appendix I:
Public Affairs Organizational Structure

Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs

- Secretary of the Air Force
- Director of Public Affairs
  - Media Operations
  - Community Relations
  - Internal Information
  - Security and Policy Review
  - Plans
  - Resources
  - National Affairs
  - AFNEWS

Major Command Public Affairs

- Director of Public Affairs
  - Media Relations
  - Community Relations
  - Internal Information
  - Security and Policy Review
  - Plans
  - Resources

Wing Public Affairs

- Chief of Public Affairs
  - Media Relations
  - Community Relations
  - Internal Information
  - Security and Policy Review

Appendix II:
Core Competencies of Public Affairs

Trusted Counsel to Leaders
Public Affairs delivers candid and timely counsel and guidance to commanders on decisions that affect the Air Force's ability to accomplish its mission.

- Public Affairs delivers candid and timely counsel and guidance to commanders on decisions that affect the Air Force's ability to accomplish its mission. This professional advice enables leaders to accurately forecast the ramifications of their actions and their impact on public opinion.

- Public Affairs professionals identify and analyze key issues, develop messages, conduct media training, target specific audiences, recommend methods of delivery, and measure and evaluate results. This process enables commanders — in peace and war — to provide factual information so the Air Force family, Congress, media and public may assess and understand how our people and programs contribute to national security.

- Trusted Public Affairs counsel to leaders helps build public support and plays a key role in achieving the Air Force core competencies: Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, and Agile Combat Support.

Airman Morale & Readiness
Public Affairs provides leaders with an arsenal of effective and efficient two-way communication tools to build, maintain and strengthen morale and readiness.

- Public Affairs provides leaders with an arsenal of effective and efficient two-way communication tools to build, maintain and strengthen morale and readiness. Airman morale and readiness is the foundation of all Air Force core competencies.

- The Air Force's most valuable resource is its airmen – active-duty and retired, officer and enlisted, Guard and Reserve, civilian and contract employees. Their dedication and expertise translate the capabilities of hardware into mission readiness. Public Affairs programs help our airmen understand their roles in the mission; explain how policies, programs and operations affect them and their families; provide avenues for feedback; and recognize individual and team achievements.

- Global engagement demands flexible, responsive Public Affairs capabilities to deploy time-sensitive information anywhere in the world within hours. Public Affairs professionals are trained and equipped to support Air Force, joint and combined operations from the home base to the bare base. Timely, relevant and accurate information is a force multiplier that enhances airman morale and readiness.

Public Trust & Support
Public Affairs strengthens the bonds between the Air Force and the public through open, honest dialogue and programs targeted to communities, opinion leaders and the media.

- Public Affairs strengthens the bonds between the Air Force and the public through open, honest dialogue and programs targeted to communities, opinion leaders and the media. Public trust and support are fundamental to a highly trained and well-equipped air and space force.

- The American public provides the people who join our Air Force, the funds that ensure readiness and quality of life, and the support needed to conduct operations and training. Public Affairs professionals assist leaders in developing messages, identifying audiences and selecting methods of delivery to promote public understanding and support of the Air Force.

- Public Affairs builds trust and support by showcasing the Air Force as a community partner and a responsible steward of public resources. Community outreach provides Americans firsthand opportunities to view the quality and capability of our people and weapon systems. Public Affairs initiatives and professional relationships with opinion leaders and the media convey Air Force core competencies to a broader audience.

Global Influence & Deterrence

Public Affairs develops and implements communication strategies targeted toward informing national and international audiences about air and space power's impact on global events.

- Public Affairs develops and implements communication strategies targeted toward informing national and international audiences about air and space power's impact on global events. The reaction of world leaders to media reports and public opinion, especially during contingencies and crises, demonstrates how media coverage can influence military operations.

- Telling the Air Force story is a force multiplier which creates virtual force projection and presence around the world. Public Affairs campaigns communicate the Air Force's air and space superiority and capabilities of global attack and rapid global mobility. Educating international audiences about Air Force core competencies deters potential adversaries. Public Affairs professionals prepare airmen for global operations, developing them into frontline ambassadors.

- Through global influence and deterrence, Public Affairs helps Air Force leaders implement the national strategy of worldwide engagement and enlargement of democratic ideals.

Source: United States Air Force, "Core Competencies of Public Affairs," PA Link, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Public Affairs, 13 October 1997.

Appendix III:
Descriptive Matrix of Public Affairs Tools

| Public Affairs Tool	Primary Core Competency Supported	Content Controlled By
AF Issues Book	TCL	Air Force
AF Issues Web Site	TCL	Air Force
AF Link	PTS	Air Force
AFRTS	AMR	Air Force
Air Force Times	PTS,TCL	Non-Air Force
Air Shows	PTS,GID	Air Force
Airman Magazine	AMR	Air Force
Base Cable TV Channel	AMR	Air Force
Base Newspapers	AMR	Air Force
Combat Camera	All	Air Force
Commander's Call	AMR	Air Force
Commander's Hotline	TCL	Non-Air Force
Facilities Tours	PTS,GID	Air Force
International News Media	GID	Non-Air Force
Local News Media	PTS	Non-Air Force
National News Media	PTS,GID	Non-Air Force
PA Link	All	Air Force
Speakers Bureau	PTS,GID	Air Force

Key
TCL: Trusted Counsel to Leaders
AMR: Airman Morale and Readiness
PTS: Public Trust and Support
GID: Global Influence and Deterrence

Appendix IV:
Wartime Public Affairs Organization

Source: Joint Publication 3-61, p. III-7

Appendix V:
Department of Defense Media Guidelines

Source: Joint Publication 3-61, p. III-2

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